ABSTRACT
In this Essay-prepared for a symposium on the Future of Fannie and
Freddie-we analyze that argument. We ask whether the shareholders of an ordinary public company could assert a similar claim under these circumstances. Those circumstances involve a lender of last resort converting a debt-like instrument to an equity-like instrument as means to protect its interests and the interests of other creditors. Indeed, our analysis of the financials of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shows that they were easily characterized as insolvent in August of 2012. Because bankruptcy law and corporate law permit the directors of a firm to take actions to protect creditors when a firm approaches insolvency, the only relevant question is whether equity had any worth at the time of Treasury's 2012 action. Just as there is no right to wipe out positive equity value, there is no obligation to force creditors to bear the full cost of risky gambles that might create it value where it does not otherwise exist. And in 2012, the creditors of Fannie and Freddie were bearing significant risk as the obligations of those entities mounted. We argue that the merits of any claim the shareholders can bring, therefore, turn entirely on the value of equity in August of 2012. We then conduct a valuation of the common stock of Fannie and Freddie and find that, under any reality-based scenario, the substantial obligations owed to Treasury and the implausibility of never-ending growth in housing markets rendered the shares worthless. To the degree that the private market analogy is apt, the shareholders' corporate claims should, thus, fail.
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Corporate law grants wide leeway to distressed firms when it comes to protecting their creditors. Indeed, the bankruptcy process would be highly problematic and often impossible if directors had to privilege shareholders above all other parties when insolvency threatens. The chorus of objectors claiming otherwise has ignored both the enormous risk facing all creditors of the Entities and the freedom that corporate law grants to limit this risk. Departing from established principles, they have implicitly suggested that a remote possibility of creating value for equity justifies (or even requires) imposing extreme risk on creditors even when the net value of that proposition is negative.
While corporate governance sometimes permits favoring debt over equity, 4 bankruptcy law often requires it. 5 Given the financial state of the Entities, actions favoring equity would have likely destroyed total value in the name of redistributing wealth from creditors to equity.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively, had $3 trillion and $2 trillion in liabilities and no equity cushion. Creditors had expressed concern.
They were bearing the risk of an organization that had little chance of 3 This essay does not explore the possibility that the government could have cut a check directly to the common shareholders. A subsidy or ex post insurance payment for equity holders would essentially be an additional bail out maneuver. The considerations behind that course of action are purely political and have nothing to do with the legal rights between the Entities and their stakeholders. 4 "Directors routinely make decisions that unambiguously favor creditors and other investors at the expense of the holders of common stock." Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 REV. , 1316 REV. (2008 . Professors Baird and Henderson highlight the most glaring example: the filing of a bankruptcy petition that destroys the future option value of equity holders. Id. While few have questioned the directors' authority to do so, those who champion a shareholder-only view of directors' duties have yet to provide a coherent justification for exceptions such as the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 1312 n.18; see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99-101 (Del. 2007) ("When a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value. Consequently, the creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties."); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-09 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991);; Vincent S. J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 ("The duty to creditors serves, in other words, as a shield to protect managers from liability to shareholders but not as a sword for creditors to assert wrongdoing."). 5 See, for example, the adequate protection requirements of 11 U.S.C. § § 362-64 (2012).
creating value for equity. In the private context, there would have been pressure to file for bankruptcy to liquidate the assets and eliminate the risk to creditors. And once in bankruptcy, the directors would have been entirely barred from taking actions to benefit equity at the expense of creditors.
Moreover, any redistribution of value to equity -beyond constituting a breach of duty and potential ground for a fraudulent conveyance claim -would produce a violation of the Absolute Priority Rule that governs analogous private transactions. If equity is worth nothing, a company can be restructured or liquidated. When that happens, equity cannot be paid a cent until every creditor is paid in full.
The same is true among layers of shareholders. Net assets must be paid in order of investment priorities. Common and preferred junior shareholders get nothing until senior preferred shareholders are paid in full. 6 If there is not enough value to pay the shareholders, they have no remedy. That is the bargain they struck. Thus, under current law and custom 7 any distribution of value to equity in August 2012 would havelike the Government's actions in the Chrysler bankruptcy 8 -violated this rule of Absolute Priority.
In this essay, we examine the 2008 and 2012 restructuring transactions. 9 We approach these transactions as corporate governance and bankruptcy lawyers rather than public policy advocates. Through that lens we demonstrate that equity's claims on Fannie and Freddie turn entirely on the valuation of the Entities as of August 2012. We explain that the substance of Treasury's and the Entities' actions -in 6 This assumes there is a payment and liquidation preference as there was in the case of the Treasury's preferred stock in the Entities. 7 Richard Epstein has referred to this rule as a "well-established norm" and a "basic rule of credit transactions. " Of course, the government's actions are complicated by the fact that they were acting as both conservator (and director) and creditor. 10 That conflict does require a showing of entire fairness from the government.
But the entire fairness analysis must be mindful of the context of the transactions. If a shareholder receives more protection than it would in the absence of a conflicted transaction, the transaction will be entirely fair. That was the case in 2008. The 2008 transaction occurred during a potential meltdown when Treasury was the only available lender for the Entities. Without Treasury's loan, equity was certain to be wiped out. In that context, the transaction is entirely fair. Indeed, in much less extreme situations, distressed debtors often must submit to harsh deals that adversely affect shareholders.
Similarly, if directors take the only available course of action in light of their duties to all stakeholders, that action will be entirely fair. That was the case in 2012. While circumstances were not as dire for the 2012 transaction, the Entities were in a precarious financial position. The risk to the creditors of the Entities was substantial and was growing each day. Given the duties that directors have to not destroy value of the corporate enterprise as a whole, even by the high standards of entire fairness, the Amendments were consistent with the fiduciary duties that were owed at the time. To demonstrate this point, we conclude with a valuation of equity and show that, under any reality-based scenario, it is unlikely that equity had positive value.
I. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
The Entities are a hybrid between public institutions and private companies -often referred to as Government Sponsored Entities. 11 The purpose behind them was essentially to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. "They purchase mortgages, guarantee them, and 10 For the purposes of this essay, we assume that it is true that the conservator had a conflict of interest. This is far from clear. has value if the Entities can cover payment defaults on the underlying mortgages. To do that they must be solvent or -as was widely inferred -the Federal Government has to back the guarantee. That inference was tested by the great financial crisis.
In September of 2008, the Entities were in steep decline. Each entity was experiencing its fifth consecutive quarter of losses. Fannie had lost at least $9 billion in that time and Freddie had lost at least $4 billion. 13 And things were rapidly deteriorating. Indeed, we now know that the Entities were at the beginning of the worst quarter in their histories. In 17 The structure allowed for the Entities to draw on the limit and prohibited Treasury from shutting down the fund. Thus, the Entities could incur losses up to the level of Treasury's commitment before any loss hit the creditors. 18 The amended formula allowed the draws from Treasury to be increased by any extra amount necessary to ensure that the net value of the Entities assets was equal to its liabilities through the end of 2012. . 30 The structure of the PSPAs, as amended in December 2009, was such that Treasury would bear all losses through the end of 2012. After that, the $200 billion per entity limit would be in effect and creditors would bear any Entities were profitable, the sweep was equal to their net worth over a set amount. That set amount started at $3 billion and was scheduled to decline by $600 million a year. The agreement also accelerated the reduction in the Entities' investment portfolio so that they would hit $250 billion by 2018. 31 Together these provisions essentially created an orderly liquidation plan for paying off creditors in full, providing the residual value to Treasury limiting the magnitude of risk faced by Treasury and creditors, and wiping out all other equity holders.
II. THE PRIVATE MARKET ANALOGY
The focus on the political aspects of the transactions highlights how unique the Amendments are. Indeed, it is hard to find analogies to the 
The Legal Protection of Creditors
The appropriate course of action for a board of directors obtaining emergency financing or reorganizing a debtor's capital structure can only be determined by looking at the risk facing each level of investors.
It is not enough to say that equity is entitled to value simply because there are good states of the world where they might recover. The directors must assess what risk the corporation would have to take to make those states of the world possible. The directors must be aware of who will lose and how much they will lose when the good states of the world do not materialize.
The more risk that operations shift to creditors, the more creditors will be concerned. This is the classic problem of risk shifting. 33 Creditors often insert covenants demanding equity cushions and performance metrics to prevent excessive risk shifting. In the absence of those covenants, we must rely on the implied covenant of good faith of the directors, the directors' ultimate duty to maximize the value of the corporate enterprise, and laws of fraudulent conveyance to protect creditors. 34 Corporate law recognizes this problem in the rules that govern fiduciary duties when a firm is in the zone of insolvency. 35 When the firm is solvent, it is easy to say that the duty to the corporation and the duty to the shareholders are usually identical. 36 The directors look out for the shareholders subject to contractual duties they owe to other constituents. But when the firm enters the zone of insolvency, the duty to the corporation as a whole may no longer look the same as the duty to the shareholders. In this situation, conflicts between creditors and shareholders are inevitable and directors must resolve those conflicts. 37 In making these choices, directors must keep in mind that, when a firm is in the zone of insolvency, it is the creditors rather than the 33 Creditors are protected by their contracts and the implied covenants of good faith. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, creditors are protected by the law of fraudulent conveyances. See Buccola, supra note 4. The upshot is that -call it a breach of fiduciary duty or a fraudulent conveyancedirectors face significant legal impediments to any attempt to enrich the shareholders of an insolvent firm in a manner that harms creditors. 42 See supra notes 34 and 42.
legally problematic. From a purely doctrinal view, the duties are, of course, neither springing nor shifting. The courts talk in terms of a duty to the corporation as a whole and note that the change is merely in the beneficiary of that duty. 43 But as a practical matter, the duty to maximize corporate value begins to look more like a duty to creditors the closer a firm gets to insolvency. And as broad as the protections of the business judgment rule are, they will only begin to encompass actions that harm shareholders when it is plausible that actions favoring shareholders will be value destroying. Again, that plausibility becomes stronger as the company nears insolvency and equity has little skin left in the game. There are different concepts of insolvency and they have no fine boundaries. Most would agree that a firm is insolvent when either its liabilities exceed its assets (balance sheet insolvency) or it can no longer pay its debt obligations as they become due (cash flow insolvency). The moment of cash flow insolvency is usually easy to identify as the firm will default on a payment. Balance sheet insolvency is equally straightforward but can sometimes be manipulated through accounting tricks. And identifying when a firm is in the vicinity of either can sometimes be a challenge. Neither is difficult, however, to identify here.
Balance sheet insolvency is straightforward. 44 A firm with negative shareholder equity value is insolvent. 45 But even a firm with positive value can be in the zone of insolvency such that its directors must 43 Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101-02 ("The corporation's insolvency makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm's value."). 44 ). Moreover, the firm's inability to borrow on collateral makes it likely that the firm will meet the requirements for cashflow insolvency.
consider the best interests of stakeholders other than equity. 46 A firm with an insignificant equity value and an enormous debt burden will be in the zone of insolvency. While it may be difficult to define insignificant equity or enormous debt with exact ratios, that sort of precision is unnecessary here. With the most favorable assumptions and looking at Fannie Mae in June of 2008, the best either firm reported was a debt burden that was around 20 times its equity value -and that was at a time when the firms were losing value rapidly. Once directors have that kind of evidence that a firm is likely to be insolvent in the near future, duties to shareholders are no longer the sole concern.
As for cash flow insolvency, neither firm defaulted on payments. 49 Id. As an accounting matter, the draws on Treasury's commitment are treated as a capital infusion so that every deficit in net value was erased in the subsequent quarter and replaced with an offsetting value added to the Senior Preferred Stock. From the view of the (junior) preferred and common stock, the decline was a real loss of asset value. Treasury's remaining commitment meant they would bear the next $80 billion in losses as well. After that, every additional dollar of loss would come out of the other creditors' pockets. 52 The numbers for Fannie were even more extreme. Fannie had liabilities of more than $3.2 trillion and its senior preferred equity had a book value of only $2.4 billion. 53 It had to earn more than $114 billion before its commons shares would be worth anything -well more than it had earned in the combined 27 years preceding the financial crisis.
Thus, equity bore no risk from maintaining the status quo. Even 
C. Treasury's Actions Through the Corporate Lens
The analysis thus far shows that the financial status of the Entities was more than sufficient to trigger the duty to a corporation as a whole. Treasury was incurring record losses and the near (if not distant) future looked bleak. While it had a portfolio of assets that might return to value when the crisis abated, the whole business would collapse if it did not get the financing to bridge it through the crisis.
This is a common state of a debtor looking for distressed debt investors. Sometimes the debtor is able to negotiate financing as part of an out-of-court restructuring. But often it is required to file for bankruptcy to reorganize the company's capital structure. Similarly, sometimes a debtor can accomplish reorganization while protecting equity and other times equity gets wiped out. Few believers in marketbased economies would suggest that equity has an absolute right to a positive return on its investment. 55 Equity's investment is junior to all 54 See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101-02. When equity's value is negative, it is technically impossible to construct a scenario where a positive value project runs to the benefit (in expectation) of shareholders at the expense of creditors. This is because the value of the assets in a well-functioning market should include the value of future projects. Thus the risk-adjusted value of the best projects that can be undertaken with those assets produces a value that is less than the liabilities of the firm. Only by shifting to very risky projects that destroy total value can expected value be created for shareholders. Of course one might argue (and equity does argue it in its lawsuit) that the balance sheet numbers do not capture the true value of the assets. Our valuation analysis below suggests that this is not likely and rests upon unrealistic assumptions about the future of the housing market.
55 Some participants at the symposium suggested that the government had given an absolute guaranty to shareholders. This, of course, would have created the mythical risk-free investment. The claim is strange. After all, an implicit guarantee to creditors (which the government appears to be making good on) would have created massive value for the shareholders. other investors. At some point, the investment and priority rights of senior investors must be protected. It is not hard to find examples of court sanctioned reorganization paths -in and out of bankruptcy -that wipe equity out even when more shareholder friendly options were available. 56 Often a bankruptcy reorganization is agreed to by the major stakeholders and ready to go at the moment of filing. That type of process is known as a pre-packaged bankruptcy. The plan can take all kinds of shapes. It can convert debt to equity. Or it can bring in new money and new ownership. And again it can -and often does -wipe out equity. That wipe out is uncontroversial. 57 But one thing a plan cannot do is violate the Absolute Priority Rule. 58 That rule says the value of the company at the time of the bankruptcy must be distributed to senior investors first. Equity, the bottom of the investment ladder, The interest they have to pay creditors on guaranteed investments is much smaller. The Entities can then turn around and invest that money and earn a higher return for shareholdres while the government bears the risk. All of that means the shareholders could expand the operations at a lower cost of credit and thus multiply the return on their investments. That creates a subsidy by reducing the cost of capital and increasing the return on investment for equity. To guarantee equity on top of that creates a second subsidy. The first subsidy allows the Entities to borrow money at a risk-free rate and invest in risky projects. If they lose the money they borrowed, the government subsidizes that. The second subsidy would provide that when the Entities lose more money than they borrowed, the government would subsidize that as well. This would create an incentive for the Entities to take on the riskiest investments they could find in the market. 56 57 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 4, at 1320 n.57 ("[I]n a perfectly standard prepackaged bankruptcy in which equity is wiped out, the directors approve a course of conduct that cannot possibly be in the shareholders' interests, yet no one suggests approving the filing of such a bankruptcy petition constitutes a violation of their fiduciary duties."). 58 At least not over objections from impaired classes. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006) (requiring a plan to be "fair and equitable"). That provision has long been understood to require absolute priority. See Casey, supra note 7, at 763 n. can only recover after all other investors have been paid in full. 59 It treats reorganization like liquidation. 60 That rule is controversial in theory. 61 For example, one might want to protect the option value that equity holders have in the potential upside of an enterprise. Remember, the bargain that equity strikes in exchange for low priority is that it enjoys the residual upside. Imagine that the Entities do not get reorganized and the real estate industry rebounds in 5 years and starts producing a certain return of $17.22 billion dollars in perpetuity? The shareholders would recover value in the event that such a miracle actually occurs. No matter how remote the possibility, why shouldn't the shareholders retain their bargained for chance at winning the lottery? 62 One of us has suggested elsewhere that perhaps they should -at least to the extent that the lottery ticket has a non-negligible probability of paying out. 63 While those arguments may have merit and those representing equity here may be in favor of such a rule, it is emphatically not the current state of the law. Under current law, as Richard Epstein has pointed out, option value must be destroyed and senior investors must get paid in full before junior investors retain any value:
It is absolutely critical to follow these priority rules inside bankruptcy in order to allow creditors to price risk outside of bankruptcy. Upsetting this fixed hierarchy among creditors is just an illegal taking of property from one group of creditors for the benefit of 59 another, which should be struck down on both statutory and constitutional grounds. 64 That means the existing law requires that equity gets nothing when it has negative value.
What does this tell us about the September 2008 transaction?
Bankruptcy was not a statutory option.
Neither was private restructuring. Instead, the Entities were placed in a conservatorship and took on loans from Treasury. We can view this through one of three lenses -but they all produce the same outcome.
Market transaction
As a purely market transaction, the PSPA looks entirely fine. The company was in a zone of insolvency. The fiduciary duties of the board, as we have recounted, ran to the company as a whole. The directors had a duty to maximize the value of the estate. Most importantly, the Entities could not take on negative value projects that benefitted shareholders at a risk to senior investors.
The problem for the directors was that doing nothing was just such a mindful of both the context of the transaction and to whom the directors owe duties at that time. 66 As for context, the prospects for finding financing in September of 2008 were dire. The market for $100 billion unsecured investments in mortgage guaranty companies that were bleeding cash had only one participant. In a private transaction, that participant would drive an incredibly hard bargain and might have demanded even more onerous terms than Treasury did. Any application of the standard of entire fairness-which requires a fair price and fair dealing-by a business savvy court would be mindful of that alternative. Moreover, failure to take the loan once it had been offered would likely have breached duties owed to their creditors and shareholders alike.
Standard reorganization
One might instead view the transaction as analogous to a Chapter 11 reorganization. Indeed, any suggestion that the conservator's actions here violate some duty might suggest that any bankruptcy filing that favors creditors over equity is problematic. 67 But most bankruptcy filings do just that. 68 In bankruptcy, the transaction looks like a DIP loan. When a debtor in distress uses bankruptcy to reorganize, it will usually need to have financing lined up. This is known as debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing. The standards for getting a DIP loan approved are often high. But that is when they subordinate secured creditors or include other extraordinary provisions. In those cases, the loans must be absolutely necessary. 69 Unsecured debt is scrutinized less closely. 70 And the code does not even include any specific requirement for a debtor incurring debt that is junior to every other creditor.
Under any standard, this loan would pass muster. Again, the terms of the loan were not extraordinary -but the size of the loan was. The This implies a return much greater than 20%. Roll-ups are considered an extraordinary term. Some courts do not allow them under any circumstances. 73 Others only allow them if the loan after a showing that certain requirements are met. 74 The Vanguard test considers the following necessary: a showing that (1) without the loan the company will fail, (2) there is no alternative financing available, (3) the lender won't take better terms, (4) and the loan is in creditors' best interest. 75 Other courts consider the Farmland factors: (1) the financing was an exercise of sound and reasonable business judgment, (2) the financing was in the best interest of the estate and its creditors, (3) the transaction was necessary to preserve the assets of the estate and for the continued operation of the business, (4) the transaction was "fair, reasonable, and adequate, given the circumstances of the debtor/borrower and the proposed lender," and (5) was negotiated in good faith and at arm's length. 76 The Lyondell loan was approved by the court. 77 As the judge put it, "In any event, by reason of present market conditions, as disappointing as the pricing terms are, I find the provisions reasonable here and now. 78 Treasury's loan to the Entities contained no security agreement, a 10% rate of return, and no roll up. In bankruptcy, the loan would not need to comply with any of these tests. It would be subject only to business judgment. Even so, the terms easily meet all factors of the Vanguard test and all but the last of the Farmland factors. 79 Nothing in either test requires equity's interests to be protected at the expense of any other stakeholder. It is quite the opposite. But even equity's best interest would have been served by the 2008 loan. The alternative was a collapse and shut down. With the loan, equity was able to retain some chance of obtaining value in the future. Of course there were the warrants for 79.9% of equity. Those were considered commitment fees.
Our intuition is that those warrants were a reasonable fee considering that the value of the underlying shares was essentially zero and considering the 7% fees approved by the court in Lyondell and other cases as well as the general sentiment that few DIP loans -much less $100 billion subordinated unsecured DIP loans -were available at any The court approved a $1.1. billion DIP loan with a dollar-for-dollar toll up. Similar to the situation we are examining, the bankruptcy resulted in the DIP lenders owning the company. 78 Lyondell Transcript, supra note 65, at 740. 79 And the lack of an arm's length negotiation is cured if the transaction is, nonetheless, entirely fair. 80 We are bracketing the massive value that the Federal Reserve provided by purchasing mortgage backed securities from Fannie and Freddie and the implicit promise that the Government was going to guarantee all debt incurred by Fannie and Freddie (both existing and future) and Treasury's additional purchases of debt in the Entities. That said, a director could reasonably believe that the Entities were in the zone of insolvency. Fannie and Freddie had each incurred four straight years of record losses followed by two quarters of profit.
Assuming away any problems with the profit estimates, that is still not a promising company. Moreover, the Entities were incurring yearly dividends of nearly $20 billion dollars and had been able to fund the quarterly obligations for the dividends out of profits only once.
On top of that, there was a $180 billion gap between the current state and a state where equity recovers. As we show below, even under optimistic assumptions, shareholders below Treasury were unlikely to see a dime.
As noted above and at the symposium, in the zone of insolvency the directors had an explicit duty to maximize the value of the corporation.
At some point, they could not force the creditors to bear risk for negative value projects that benefit equity. Directors offered with a restructuring (in or out of bankruptcy) that protects creditors and winds the company down in an orderly fashion would be hard pressed to justify maintaining the status quo that seeks an unlikely profit for shareholders by shifting so much risk to creditors.
Critics have ignored that the creditors were in a very risky position. Indeed, the only protection the creditors enjoyed was a $4.9 billion cushion (of preferred equity) financed by Treasury. To be clear that means that the first $4.9 billion in losses would run to the senior preferred shareholder (Treasury) and all other losses would run to the creditors. 81 No losses from any risky project would run to equity because it had no value. With such a small cushion those creditors were bearing enormous risk.
As with the 2008 Transactions, the most viable objection was that the 2012 transactions amounted to impermissible self-dealing. But convincing a court that the deals were not entirely fair would be a challenge. As discussed above, the Entities would need to show that the price they received was fair and that the process they used to arrive at that price was fair. As courts emphasize, the "preponderant" element in this inquiry is the price. Amendments, it looks like Treasury overpaid and did so in a way that benefited the other creditors and caused no harm to equity. 83 We explain the details of our analysis more thoroughly in Section III, infra. We base the calculations of the value of the dividends on the assumption that there will be no further draws from Treasury and we apply a discount rate of five percent. We calculate the value of the dividend and the value of the expected cash flow until 2025, which we view as a reasonable date for windup of the Entities. We calculate a net present value of $67.2 billion for the Freddie dividends and $110.0 billion for the Fannie dividends. We are generous when it comes to cash flow. We project out 2012 profits and we assume that the Entities will be able to release all of their loan loss reserves. We expect, however, that profitability will decline by ten percent a year due to the mandated reduction in loan portfolios of the Entities. The net present value of the cash flow, which discounts cash flows for ten years, is $63.8 billion for Freddie and $75.6 for Fannie.
This analysis shows that the price paid by the Entities was sufficiently high to survive the fair price element of an entire fairness analysis. As mentioned above, courts view price as the "preponderant concern" when they analyze whether self-dealing is permissible or not.
But fair dealing is also part of the entire fairness inquiry. What to do when the price is fair but the process is not poses a bit of a doctrinal puzzle for courts. 84 If a court determines that there has been a breach of fiduciary duty by virtue of a fair price, damages are likely to be zero.
But if there is no breach of fiduciary duties when the price is fair, why even bother with fair dealing? Current trends suggest that, where price is fair, courts will ignore process defects and conclude that the transaction is entirely fair. 85 A recent case that bears important similarities to the Fannie and Freddie deals is emblematic of that trend. In re Trados Incorporate Securities Litigation involved a deal to sell the company where management received a payout pursuant to change-of-control provisions in their contracts, preferred shareholders got the remainder of the consideration, and common equity got nothing. 86 During the ensuing challenge, the court determined that the process followed by the company was not fair. Nevertheless, there was no violation of entire fairness because the liquidation preference of the preferred stockholders exceeded even common equity's estimate of the discounted cash flow value of the company. The price was thus fair and the failure to follow appropriate process irrelevant. So while there is little evidence of the process that lead to the Amendments, it does not matter if equity has no value. We explore the question whether the equity of the Entities had value more fully in the next section. 84 
III. VALUATION
The analysis thus far shows that, as matters of corporate and bankruptcy law, the claims of the shareholders are thin. To value equity, we must first establish a time horizon. Unlike a standard valuation, when one does not know when the business will terminate, Treasury had a goal of winding down the Entities. 88 Consistent with that goal, we use a ten-year time frame. 89 We assume that, at the time of wind down, any assets would first be used to pay off Treasury's liquidation priority. Any remainder would then be distributed to other creditors, including shareholders. At an absolute minimum, any projection must show that the Entities would have had 87 This is unquestionably the correct time to gauge the value of equity. As courts have long emphasized, decisions made under distressed circumstances should not be evaluated with the benefit of hindsight. 88 The goal of winding down the Entities was a component of the 2008 agreement, which required a ten-percent reduction in the investment portfolios of Fannie and Freddie. See "Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, (August 17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1684.aspx. The 2012 PSPA increased that amount to fifteen percent. 89 There are tradeoffs to using different time horizons. If one uses a short window the Entities will not have to pay as many dividends to Treasury, but they will also have less time to accumulate reserves to pay off the liquidation priority. A longer window poses the opposite problem. There is more time to accumulate reserves, but the Entities must pay dividends for a longer period of time. were from a one-time tax settlement. 93 More troublingly, a substantial amount of the earnings for both companies was attributable to a decrease in loss reserves. When the Entities report income from interest on their loan portfolios they must offset an amount for the losses they expect from defaults on the loans. As one would expect, the provisions for credit losses ballooned during the financial crisis. As the housing market improved in 2012, the Entities began to cut back sharply on their provisions for losses.
But the ability to increase earnings through a decrease in credit loss provisions cannot continue forever. To put the point more bluntly, this aspect of the Entities' earnings is a finite resource that is not a source of real revenue. The same Moody's report quoted above estimated that Fannie's benefit from releasing its reserves would top out at $34.7 billion and while Freddie would be able to release $19.2 billion. 94 Indeed, Moody's viewed the 2012 earnings of the Entities as substantially inflated due to this effect of credit provisioning. These circumstances produced a telling prediction: "once the benefit of reserve release runs its course, we believe the government sponsored enterprises' (GSEs) ultimate path remains unchanged: they will deplete their capital bases because the dividends they'll be paying on their preferred securities will be greater than their earnings." 95 In other words, the reserves set aside for credit losses would be depleted and, at that point, the profitability of the Entities would be far less rosy.
To account for the impact of these credit loss provisions, we assume that profits will fall once the Entities's release of loss reserves reaches the remaining benefit projected by Moody's ($34.7 billion for Fannie and $19.2 billion for Freddie). To provide a sense of how sensitive the valuation is to this parameter, we vary the percentage of profits that are attributable to the release of reserves. As that percentage increases, the 93 Treasury's liquidation preference. Or, to put it another way, equity would be worthless. This is the case even if we assume that none of Freddie's future profits would be attributable to the release of loss reserves. As the Moody's report above suggests, that assumption is very optimistic and likely overstates the likelihood of profits because a fair 96 We assume a modest discount rate of five percent. 97 See supra __. 98 Freddie Mac Third Quarter Financial Results at 3, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/er/pdf/2012er-3q12_release.pdf. As explained above this "net worth" belonged entirely to Treasury as a preferred shareholder. If we treat Treasury as a creditor and the preferred shares as debt, the entities have negative net worth. portion of Freddie's 2012 earnings were attributable to the release of reserves.
Even if one makes the assumption that earnings would grow, things still look bleak for equity. With a five percent annual growth rate in earnings and an expectation that only 20 percent of earnings would be attributable to the release of loan loss reserves, Freddie would still be unable to pay off Treasury after ten years. Once gain, only the most optimistic assumptions produce an analysis that shows equity having any real value. For example, with an eight percent annual rate of earnings growth and twenty-five percent of earnings attributable to the release of loss reserves, the discounted value of equity share would be roughly $1.26 billion.
The projections for Fannie Mae are not quite as dire, but it is still difficult to come up with a believable scenario where equity has value. loss reserves, the valuation shows some value for equity. With those parameters, the projection is that the discounted value of equity would be in the range of $1.9 billion. But again we must emphasize that this outcome is the best possible scenario for equity. The assumptions that get us there are unrealistically optimistic. In the middle of 2012, the future of housing was uncertain and there was a stated desire by Treasury and Congress to wind down Fannie and Freddie. Thus, the only way to arrive at a value of $1.9 billion 100 is to adopt assumptions of sustained growth in both housing prices and in the profits of the Entities that stretch credulity beyond its breaking point. 99 See Fannie Mae, Third Quarter 10-Q at 4, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annualresults/2012/q32012.pdf. 100 While that number may appear large in absolute terms, it is worth noting that it is it is miniscule relative to the size of Fannie's portfolio and liabilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Of course there may be other objections to the propriety of the government's action. Politically it may be distasteful. One might question why the government would insist on payments to certain equity holders when it bailed out the automobile industry but made no effort to distribute value to equity holders of the Entities. Professor
Henderson made this point salient with his presentation at the symposium. Similarly, one might object to the government selectively acting as a private market participant. Finally, one might think the world is better off if Fannie and Freddie continue operation in their current form.
But those are political objections. For lawyers, the questions are more straightforward. For equity to prevail in its claim against the government, it needs to show that it was entitled to some right that was violated. If they claim a taking, they need to identify the property that was taken. If they claim a violation of fiduciary duty, they need to identify the duty that was violated and the damages that resulted. Their ability to do so turns on the value of Fannie and Freddie as of August 2012. If the companies were worth less than their debts plus their obligations under the senior preferred shareholders, then they had no property to be taken and suffered no damages from any breach of duty.
If the companies were worth more, that value is the potential recovery for preferred shareholders to go after. Any deviations from these principles will suggest that government involvement in private markets is subject to special treatment. While the Chrysler bankruptcy provides precedent for this exceptional course of action, it is a dangerous path to tread. With good reason, the Chrysler bankruptcy has been almost universally criticized on those grounds. 101 In light of the unfortunate (and illegal) payments that were transferred to junior investors in the Chrysler bankruptcy, those who value the rule of law should take comfort that the Government abstained from repeating such action here. Had they done so (and if the courts require them to do so) it would further entrench the Chrysler precedent for similar maneuvers in the future. It may also distort corporate governance and finance law in other unpredictable ways. 101 Epstein, supra note 7. But see Baird, supra note 1.
